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ABSTRACT
This journal strongly supports the sharing of data to support research and quality 
improvement. However, this needs to be done in a way that ensures the benefits 
vastly outweigh the risks, and vitally using methods which are inspire both pub-
lic and professional confidences – robust pseudonymisation is needed to achieve 
this. The case for using routine data for research has already been well made and 
probably also for quality improvement; however, clearer mechanisms are needed 
of how we test that the public interest is served. Ensuring that the public interest is 
served is essential if we are to maintain patients’ and public’s trust, especially in the 
English National Health Service where the realpolitik is that patients can opt out of 
data sharing. 
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SHARING HEALTH INFORMATION 
HAS BENEFITS AND THERE ARE 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR 
PSEUDONYMISATION
Sharing personal health information, in a way that keeps it 
private, has long been a tradition in the United Kingdom, 
with these data supporting a wide research and quality 
improvement agenda. The use of data in this way under-
pins our understanding of health and disease, particularly 
in primary care.
The founding fathers of academic primary care con-
ducted research using routinely collected practice data. 
William Pickles’ description of infectious disease, Frans 
Huygen’s Families with their Illness and John Fry’s 
Common Morbidity’ were produced in an era of paper 
data collection, and provide examples of general prac-
tice research that changed the face of medicine.
Use of these data has provided opportunities and at the same 
time challenges.1 Whilst there is always scope to improve the 
way these data are used, we also need to improve the way 
they are kept private, as the scope for inference attack and 
other ways of potentially reidentifying individuals becomes 
easier with advances in technology.2,3
Pseudonymisation, the process by which data have per-
sonal details removed and substituted by other flags, pro-
vides a mechanism by which privacy can be maintained, 
at the same time as allowing linkage of data to other key 
information. Pseudonymisation can be conducted using an 
International Standards Organisation (ISO) defined process. 
This process was defined by its Technical Committee (TC) 
on Health Informatics (ISO/TC 215). This TC has a number 
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of working groups (WGs), including WG4, which looks at 
security. WG4 produced a number of technical specifications 
(TSs), including ISO/TS 25237:2008 on pseudonymisation.4 
This standard
 • sets out the basic concept of pseudonymisation;
 • provides different use cases for pseudonymisation 
that can be both reversible and irreversible;
 • describes a method for pseudonymisation services 
both organisational and technical;
 • gives a guide of how to conduct a risk assessment for 
reidentification;
 • specifies a policy framework and minimal 
requirements for
 • the trustworthy practice of a pseudonymisation 
service;
 • controlled re-identification;
 • specifies interfaces for the interoperability of 
services.5 
More recent developments in pseudonymisation have 
included how to give patients control6 and enhanced methods 
to underpin translational research.7 The technical require-
ments for providing such a solution are well described.8 There 
have been recent efforts to create an open pseudonymisation 
standard for the National Health Service (NHS) that would 
enable pseudonymisation at source.9
MAINTAINING PUBLIC TRUST AND  
OPTING OUT
Trust and public faith in the professionalism of health 
service managers are essential and cannot be taken for 
granted.10 The provision of the Data Protection Act (DPA), 
which in turn is based on a European treaty, provides 
 principles that ensure that there is only proper use of 
data.11 The key principles of the DPA classify those who 
handle personal data as 
 • ‘data controllers’ – who hold data, such as general 
practices and hospitals;
 • ‘data processors’ – who process personal data on 
behalf of the data controller;
 • neither – some organisations involved with data may 
neither be a data controller or processor.
All organisations that hold personal data must be registered 
under the provisions of the DPA, and they must also adhere 
to its principles. These include responding to ‘subject access 
requests’ and ensuring that processing of data is fair, lawful, 
purposeful, not excessive, kept secure and not sent over-
seas. Health organisations are not exempt from these pro-
visions and compliance helps to ensure public and patient 
trust. 
Concerns, primarily in England, about the use of data 
within the NHS may have the potential to result in many indi-
viduals opting out of allowing their data to be shared. There 
appears to be a realpolitik that individuals will have the right 
to opt out of having their data uploaded. There have been 
number of objections raised about the use of health data by 
the English NHS and a lack of awareness of any information 
being provided to the public.12 Should significant numbers 
opt out then this would seriously undermine the representa-
tiveness of these data?
Currently, most data sources have a review process prior 
to data being made available for research or other quality 
improvement processes. The same standards of review need 
to be applied when data are to be used outside the health 
care system. This should include a clear statement of the 
benefits, purpose and any risks.
Overall, the impression of the current care.data scheme, 
in the English NHS, is one that lacks the confidence of much 
of the public and the profession. This article suggests that 
the way to restore this is to need to be explicit about the 
purpose for which data are going to be used, be clear about 
the public interest and move to pseudonymisation of data at 
source.13
SUMMARY – WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
It is important that the provisions of the DPA are strictly 
adhered to. Whilst there is no suggestion that these are 
being breached, the development of a clearer way of 
developing the public interest case would help to ensure 
that key DPA principles such as purpose, adequacy and 
not being excessive have been carefully thought through. 
The review process that most data sources go through 
prior to releasing data should explicitly include this 
function. 
The technical approach to data extraction needs to have 
the confidence of informed professionals. Several groups are 
arguing that the way forward should be one of pseudonymi-
sation at source, as this provides the best possible mech-
anism for ensuring privacy. Research and demonstration 
projects to establish or refute this notion need to be urgently 
put in place. 
Finally, we should not miss out on the potential benefits 
of research and quality improvement that can be derived 
from routine data. There is potential to improve patient 
safety: and address major quality problems using routine 
data. The rogue GP Howard Shipman could have been 
flagged,14 and the Mid-Staffordshire Trust can was identi-
fied sooner from routine data; had we had screening mech-
anisms in place.15
The benefits for research, quality improvement and 
patient safety from the processing of routine data should 
not be lost as a result of overstatement of the risks. 
However, we need to be much more explicit about the ben-
efits to the public of processing such data and implement 
methods of pseudonymisation that minimise any risk of pri-
vacy breeches, and have the confidence of experts in our 
domain. 
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